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The Vulnerability Problem of Business Ecosystems under Global Decoupling 
 
Current dialogue on de-globalization and global decoupling is pervasive but seems to focus 
merely on the reasoning behind the phenomenon from the perspectives of geopolitical and 
international relations, such as protectionism, technological nationalism, and the varieties of 
capitalism. Advancing this dialogue in international business (IB), we focus on the vulnerability 
problem of multinational enterprises (MNEs) under global decoupling. This commentary aims to 
improve MNEs’ ability to adapt to challenging exogenous shocks (i.e., de-globalization 
movements as an exogenously occurring event that can affect MNEs’ business globally but 
cannot be resolved by their management and activities). Assuming that global decoupling occurs 
as an intermittently adjusting process in the transitioning period after a challenging shock, we 
adopt multi-layered thinking to discuss what salient contexts can exacerbate global decoupling 
and how MNEs can resolve the vulnerability problem of operating loosely coupled systems. For 
example, personal protective equipment products have been manufactured through optimal 
global value chains. But the global shortage of these products shows evidence that international 
lockdowns since the COVID-19 pandemic have negatively affected the functioning of loosely 
coupled ecosystems. So, how can MNEs’ globally operating business ecosystems adapt to 
unprecedented global decoupling? Answering it helps IB scholars to take account of different 
factors and associated business patterns regarding the loosely coupled governance structures of 
MNEs that pursue resilience under global decoupling. 
THE MULTI-LAYERED VIEW ON GLOBAL DECOUPLING 
To address the question, we suggest the multi-layered view, including a macroeconomic level, a 
firm-level, and an individual level. At each of the three contextual levels, we address the 




decoupling and suggest implications for MNEs, which we organize as follows: (1) why global 
decoupling can be exacerbated, (2) how global decoupling affects loosely coupled business 
ecosystems, and (3) implications for MNEs’ global strategies. 
Why Global Decoupling can be Exacerbated 
Since World War II, the world economy couched with network structures has changed 
substantially over time. First, Cold War tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States 
separated the economies of their respective allies as the two centralized network structures (see 
Figure 1a).  Second, the post-Cold War global economic growth era saw the establishment of 
various regional trading blocs, such as the European Union, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, creating a decentralized network 
structure (see Figure 1b). Finally, since the dawn of the 21st century, we have started seeing free 
trade agreements extended beyond regions, such as the EU-Japan Economic Partnership 
Agreement, the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), characterizing a more distributed network structure (see Figure 1c).  
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
-------------------------------------- 
With these nontrivial changes at the macroeconomic level, the world economy is 
observed to be distributed in different regions and countries, resulting in a global decoupling. 
According to the World Bank’s (2020) analysis on world economies based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP), the PPP-based GDP's regional portions have become similar to each other (see 
Figure 2). This means that global economies have become relatively distributed economies (i.e., 
globally scattered demand and supply). More apparently, as shown in Figure 3, variance among 




countries achieve their own economic development through economic and technological 
upgrading, their unilateral dependencies on developed countries, characterized by a classic 
centralized network structure, have decreased. Instead, multilateral interdependencies across 
countries seem to be more plausible in the distributed economies as global markets are further 
extended. 
---------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 and 3 HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
 Another significant cause of the global decoupling, at the firm-level, is the emergence of 
global platform-based business models, such as Airbnb, Uber, Tencent, and Alibaba. Such 
platform-providing focal firms catalyze the emergence of product ecosystems and motivate 
customers to consume the focal firm's products and complementary goods from individual 
complementary partners (Jacobides, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2018). While traditional business 
models emphasize investing in local assets to take advantage of supply-side advantages, such as 
high-tech in developed countries and cheap labor markets in developing countries, platform-
based business models encourage firms to reduce direct investment in assets and increase 
intangible efforts for complementarity among partners. This open system of platform-based 
business models can lead to global decoupling trends in terms of not requiring as much FDI 
investment across different countries as under the traditional MNE model that connects foreign 
subsidiaries hierarchically. 
 In the globally dispersed economy, ruthless competition at the individual level 
unavoidably ignites individuals’ negative attitude toward globalization, resulting in populism, 
which has been seen in many democratic countries. In particular, globalization's negative shock 




better electoral results. From this political science perspective, recent global decoupling can be 
seen as a manifestation of the accumulated frustrations of people who have been adversely 
affected by the governments of developed countries that incessantly seek freer trade, and freer 
mobility of money and labor. Those people with low education levels and low skill sets in the 
developed countries are vulnerable to global job markets because of the lack of competitiveness 
compared to those in the emerging economies, including China and India. Since they did not 
have much political say, politicians have ignored their negative situations during rapid 
globalization periods. However, recent politicians have paid attention to this underclass with 
their populistic messages, such as anti-free trade and anti-immigration. Also, these populistic 
programs can be reinforced by social identity like cultural and racial attitudes. Thus, the appeals 
of the populists to the working class that wants to recover their low-skilled jobs in developed 
countries have provoked global decoupling like Brexit and protectionism.  
How Global Decoupling Can Affect Loosely Coupled Business Ecosystems 
At the macroeconomic level, distributed economies lead to dispersed technological knowledge and 
heterogeneous preferences in different markets (Hayek, 1945). As shown in Figure 1c, the 
distributed economies have a complex network structure where almost all nodes connect each other. 
For example, Australia, Korea, Japan, and Mexico remain supporters of globalization and open 
economy (e.g., RCEP) for their export-based models and increase multilateral agreements across 
different regions. This type of network could have the problem of network congestion due to too 
many different agreements, which may increase the possibility of network destruction when huge 
external shocks occur beyond the threshold of multilateral interdependencies, that is, the extent to 
which each node cannot coordinate its agreements (Balsa-Barreiro, et al., 2020). While the 




the capacity of the center and sub-centers to adapt to external shocks, the vulnerability of 
distributed systems hinges on the degree of network congestion. For example, the European 
Central Bank, as a sub-center of the global banking system, failed to resolve the Greek public debt 
crisis in 2009 and caused harmful side effects in other eurozone countries such as Italy and Spain, 
which implies that absorbing the financial crisis shocks relied upon the roles of the sub-centers of 
the decentralized network. However, the distributed economies, such as multilateral agreements 
with plural FTAs, can be vulnerable to external shocks due to excessive interdependencies that 
cause network congestion and difficulty in coordinating dispersed knowledge and different 
interests. For instance, the complex multilateral relationships between financial institutions led to 
the burst of real estate in the U.S. resulting in the global financial crisis in 2008. The excessive 
risk-taking in the U.S. banks and other financial institutions has been contagious in the world, but 
each institution failed to resolve the network congestion by itself. Only the bankruptcy or default 
among financial institutions reduced the excessive links. 
 At the firm-level, in the business trends of platformization (i.e., business models using 
common platforms to bridge transactions between two or multiple parties as two-sided markets, 
for example, eBay and Uber), focal firms tend to reduce ownership-based authority over external 
partners and shift their organizational governance from ownership-based systems to platform-
based systems without ownership (Jacobides et al., 2018). This platformization facilitates 
autonomous and open systems enabling efficient extensions. As it is not possible to use traditional 
hierarchical mechanisms such as exclusive contracts, acquisitions, and other equity-based alliances, 
it would be necessary for MNEs to invent a new control mechanism for their organizations to build 
ecosystems with autonomous partners. However, if platform companies use their brokerage 




global decoupling. The conflicts between EU lawmakers and American platform-based technology 
companies, such as Facebook, Google, Apple, and Amazon, exemplify. 
 At the individual level, although many developing countries continue to support 
globalization for their economic growth through international trade and global value chains, global 
decoupling in some developed countries can hamper the loosely coupled activities of MNEs from 
developing countries. Hence, the real challenge can be different between MNEs from developed 
countries and MNEs from developing countries: (1) how developed-country MNEs cater to global 
consumer needs by not creating additional ire from now-protectionist politicians at home, and (2) 
how developing-country MNEs cater to global (especially developed-country) markets by not 
creating ire from now-protectionist developed countries. 
Implications for MNEs’ Global Strategies 
At the macroeconomic level, it would be necessary for MNEs to consider a new way of 
integrating the dispersed knowledge (e.g., technology, experience, and interests) across different 
times and places in these distributed economies. One possible solution is an ecosystem-based 
approach to managing this complexity. The ecosystem approach includes not only the type of 
two-sided markets (i.e., the focal firm’s platformization) but the type of industry clusters that 
include all possible stakeholders to operate MNEs’ activities. When penetrating foreign markets, 
MNEs may consider nurturing local ecosystems to integrate dispersed knowledge by using 
ecosystem-specific advantages, such as complementarity, positive externalities, and aligning 
rules of autonomous actors, to manage value co-creation among ecosystem participants 
(Jacobides et al., 2018). For example, ARM, a semiconductor intellectual property (IP) upstream 
provider, entered a Chinese market in 2001, when there was no existing market for ARM’s IP. 




complementary partners and enabling lead partners to coordinate complementary partners 
autonomously. This business ecosystem approach allows many firms to integrate dispersed 
knowledge autonomously through complex interactions. 
 At the firm-level, to avoid the risk of global decoupling, MNEs’ operating platform 
businesses in foreign markets may need to consider self-organizing ecosystems to attract 
autonomous participation without using tangible powers (i.e., brokerage powers, reputations, and 
other market leader status). Self-organizing ecosystems are based on the mechanisms of 
facilitating positive feedback loops by network effects and co-evolution between the platform 
leader and participants. For example, innovation clusters exemplify self-organized business 
ecosystems through positive feedback loops of sharing resources and knowledge spillover. As 
such, these MNEs should build up competence to design and manage their common platform 
enabling so-called virtual agglomeration effects within the business ecosystems. 
 Furthermore, MNEs must intensify resilient and adaptive capabilities quickly to respond 
to the populistic backlash against their global activities that could cause the potential risks of 
economic dislocation at the individual level. In that, they may need to reconsider boosting up the 
local economy for their sustainable business in the host countries. For instance, many large Asian 
companies with enough resources have established factories close to customers in the U.S. to 
meet the demands and avoid populistic policies and uncertainty. Foxconn’s plan to investing in a 
display panel manufacturing plant in Wisconsin exemplifies this effort to avoid a populistic 
backlash. The organizational agility of MNEs to reallocate complementary assets within the 
business ecosystems could be an essential factor in the context of global decoupling. 
 In short, MNEs are able to reconsider these issues of dispersed knowledge, platform 





In this commentary, we adopt multi-layered thinking to systematically analyze the causes and 
effects of global decoupling that creates potential vulnerability problems for the MNEs operating 
with loosely coupled business ecosystems. Then, we further offer several feasible solutions for 
these MNEs to effectively respond to the challenging shock. Such an approach contributes to the 
IB literature by advancing the existing knowledge of governance and control mechanisms for 
MNEs operating with loosely coupled systems in the context of global decoupling and, equally 
importantly, by providing concrete implications for global strategies. This multi-layered view 
provides a useful steppingstone for the scholars from IB, management, and other fields as they 
make further efforts to understand other related, important questions (e.g., how global value 
chains adapt to global decoupling) and conduct empirical investigations, all of which are 
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The Evolution of Economic Network Structures 
 
 
Note: A solid line represents a tightly coupled relationship between countries with specific 
agreements. The dashed line depicts the loosely coupled relationship between international 








Changes in Regional Portions of World Economies 
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The Variance of Regional Portions of World Economies 
 
 
Note: The reduced trends of variance and standard deviation imply differences in the size of 
economies by region are decreasing. But the rapid increases in 2019 could be associated with the 
difference by region in national policies to block economic activities in response to the Covid-19 
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